"Truth will out" said the clown, Launcelot Gobbo, in Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice, a role I once played to universal acclaim, well, the 'Memsahib' said I wasn't too bad, really, and 'SoD' shrugged and said I was alright - well, he was a teenager and lacked vocabulary! Anyway, the truth of Shakespeare's warning is becoming apparent as the war in Afghanistan winds down to a bloody end, or at least, an end as far as the British army is concerned. Over the last couple of years more and more reports are being published whose constant theme is the almost total uselessness of the army's high command. Perhaps the most lethal is that of Frank Ledwidge, a barrister by profession but also a reservist with a very distinguished history of attachments to various forces in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. As a reservist, of course, he is somewhat detached from the 'clubbable' atmosphere of the army command structure.
He has a book(1) coming out and in last Saturday's Daily Mail he has written a devastating condemnation of British operational procedures in Afghanistan. I should add, hurriedly, that he has nothing but admiration for the Toms', their NCOs and the junior officers involved 'up the sharp end'. It is at the High Command level and the Ministry of Defence that most of his missiles are aimed. He is not the first. Back in 2009, Stephen Grey wrote a corruscating piece in Prospect entitled Cracking on in Afghanistan. A week later it was followed by a similar piece in Prospect written by Anthony King entitled Why we're getting it wrong in Afghanistan with an understrap saying The British army's determination to "crack on" in Helmand may be brave, but foolish.
The injunction "Crack on!" appears to have reached the level of Holy writ within army circles. It is used by junior commanders in the field to maintain the sort of positive and aggressive attitude any army requires at the front line. However, it seems to have been absorbed by senior commanders on their way up the promotional ladder who have failed to appreciate that high command requires a totally different level of sophistication than just "Crack on!"
It seems to me that from the very beginning the top brass of the army, imbued with this "Crack on!" spirit learned at regimental level and seemingly never knocked out of them at Staff College level, always lacked the guts to tell the politicians to get stuffed! In other words, to have the courage, of the sort demonstrated daily by their 'Toms', to face up to Blair and then Brown and tell them that if operational needs were not satisfied then the operations would not take place - and if that costs me my place in the Lords, so be it! Thus it was, in the beginning, that a mere 3,000-odd men were sent to control a province, Helmand, the size of Wales. Later, the politicians now seeing the disasters building and feeling the heat from the voters, they relented and men and machines, of a sort, were deployed, but it is at that point that the Brass cannot shuck off their responsibilities on to the politicians. As Ledwidge points out in The Mail:
In Basra, at least 14 Brigadier and 14 Major-Generals served in command roles, again weakening the focus of responsibility.
Many more worked as staff officers. The same is true of Helmand, which has involved ten Brigadiers and at the very least four Major-Generals. What was particularly striking for me was how, in both theatres, a vast bureaucracy accompanied each British force, making a mockery of all the complaints about resources.
At Basra, the headquarters near the airport was a massive air-conditioned complex, full of offices, computers, administrators, managers, liaison personnel, communications staff, cookhouses, media operations, planners, and even a logistical office which effectively amounted to a travel agency.
The support operation was so big that the front-line was almost an irrelevance. Astonishingly, out of almost 8,000 troops, only 200 would be available for patrol on any given day. (My emphasis)
In the same article Ledwidge is vitriolic on the subject of the senior command structure:
Today, there are more generals in the Army than helicopters or operational tanks, while the Royal Navy has more admirals than ships and the RAF has three times as many senior officers as there are flying squadrons.
There are three times more senior officers than Apache attack helicopters which have played a vital role in Afghanistan. In the Army, we have only 10 deployable brigades, yet there are at least 170 brigadiers, 20 more than in 1997.
Similarly, we have just two armoured fighting divisions that could be put into the field (albeit with a great deal of notice,) yet the Army feels it necessary to employ no fewer than 37 major-generals. We have just a single army corps, yet enough lieutenant-generals to command 17 of them.
The absurdity of structure is made even more clear when it is compared to other armed forces. In America, for instance, the mighty U.S. Army has 302 generals compared to the British Army’s 255.
Furthermore the 210,000-strong U.S. Marine Corps, larger than all our three services combined, has just 84 general officers, eight times less than the number of generals in Britain.
As for the MoD, it appears to me that the best action we could take today is to 'nuke' it! Although the generals heaped the blame on Brown for lack of resources it was their own greed and stupidity in running the procurement programmes that had much to do with the lack of proper kit. Ledwidge again:
Moreover, though Dannatt and his colleagues are fond of blaming ministers, those really responsible for procurement in the Ministry of Defence are senior officers themselves, who are supposed to have a unique insight into the needs of the military.
Yet procurement in their hands has been an absolute scandal, with tens of billions wasted on flawed projects. Eager to boost its own sense of self-importance, the top brass prefer big, high-tech, advanced new pieces of equipment rather than just the basics.
The price of five Eurofighter Typhoons, retailing at about £120m each (we have 56 with another 160 on order,) dedicated to the care of veterans would ensure that no wounded soldier would have to fight for proper life-long care again.
This cocktail of egotism and misuse of resources can be found on an even bigger scale in the bloated, top-heavy structure of our three armed services. The scale of senior hierarchy graphically exposes the fallacy, so sedulously cultivated by the generals themselves, that our military is underfunded. The statistics of this bureaucracy are truly astounding.
Given the current headlines concerning our so-called Minister of Defence, Liam Fox, it appears that he has barely a thimble-full of judgment and I suspect the generals and their civil servants in the MoD, let alone the smoothies from the defence industries, will run rings around him - and he was supposed to be on the ball because he had spent years as the shadow Defence minister. Well, now the hard, brutal, financial fact is that we can no longer afford these absurd Generals, Air Marshalls and Admirals and it is time to rid the country of them, along with the pipe dreams of our equally deluded politicians.
(1) Losing Small Wars: British Military Failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, by Frank Ledwidge, published by Yale University Press. Tel orders @ £17, p&p free, on 0843 382 0000
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