Enough shame to share round!

In a post down below I discussed the American campaign in the Pacific during WWII, as described by Ronald H. Spector in his book The Eagle Against the Sun.  I was sardonically amused when Spector pointed out that America had entered the first world war because of the German policy of unrestricted submarine warfare which was then considered to be a crime against humanity.  In the second world war, the Americans started as they intended to finish, with unrestricted submarine warfare!  Similarly, airforce commanders around the world believed that pinpoint aerial bombardment was a strategic weapon system capable of winning wars.  It rapidly became apparent that with the technology of the day, the 'pinpoint' element in that proposition was incapable of being put into practice, and so what was, in effect, carpet bombing of both military and civilian targets took place.  In Japan, especially, whole cities were deliberately put to the torch by napalm incendiary attacks.  I should add quickly, lest my American readers take umbrage, that 'Bomber' Harris and the RAF were undertaking a similar carpet bombing strategy over Germany in which tens of thousands of civilians were killed.

Now, how you react to these historical reminders will depend partly on your approach to the conduct of war.  Clausewitz, for example, urged that war should be executed with extreme ruthlessness because only the utter destruction of the enemy's means of resistance would bring a war to a quick end.  However, in what I will call the 'Anglosphere' there has been a substantial reluctance to push the conduct of warfare to its extremes, indeed, it has taken the push of dire circumstances to provoke the Anglosphere nations to follow Clausewitz's prescription - but in the end we gritted our teeth, half closed our eyes and did it!  There are those, of course, who maintain that our conduct and reputation was thus reduced to the level of our enemies.  Further, they maintain that today, any complaints by America (or any other member of the Anglosphere) as to the conduct of hostile nations is hypocrisy of the first order since we are no better than they are.  It is sometimes a difficult charge to refute but the clue lies in the word 'hypocrisy'.  I am very much in favour of hypocrisy.  To be a hypocrite is to do something immoral whilst pretending to be moral yourself but, and this is the point, to be able to do that it is essential that you know the difference between morality and immorality.  Those national leaders who conduct war without regard to morality do so because they simply are a-moral, that is, they are incapable of differentiating between right and wrong because such notions have no meaning for them.  There-in lies the difference between the Japanese high command in the 1930s and '40s, and the admittedly mixed standards of the Anglosphere leaders.  It is also worth noting that even to this day some of our actions still leave a residue of shame; and shame, of course, is the critically important element in deciding whether a nation or its leadership has been able to recognise that it owes a duty, albeit in the circumstances of war, a severely inhibited duty, to all human beings not just their own citizens.

I should add that I, personally, tend rather more toward the Clausewitzean philosophy but with one large proviso.  Outright brutality and cruelty does not always work, indeed, quite often it has a detrimental effect on your own side.  For example, killing prisoners in order to strike terror in your enemies will probably result in hardening their resolve to fight on, where-as a policy of treating prisoners well and even generously, whilst ensuring that the other side knows this, will encourage them to throw down their arms.  Similarly, the German blitz on London only resulted in an increased determination to resist, and my guess is that our subsequent onslaught on German cities had a similar effect. So, in my view, like any other tactic or strategy employed in war, extreme cruelty needs to be judged on one criteria - does it work?

Comments

[Hank]

David

Your usual insightful analysis.

I took your advice and bought a copy of Dreadnought. It’s size and weight are seriously destabilizing my “to be read pile.” In view of this post I would like to return the compliment and recommend http://www.amazon.co.uk/American-Way-War-Military-Strategy/dp/025328029X/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1219523408&sr=1-4>The American Way of War. When I first read it I was a little disappointed because it was only fantastic, not the tremendous that most of the reviews said.

It puts a real context on the way the US military does things when it has the choice. And why things can go right or wrong. Undoubtedly you can recite all the details of the UK/US high command bickering during WW II. This provides a good explanation of why the US military understood the situation the way it did and what it wanted do about it.

My summary: The American way of war is Neo-Clausewitzean without having read Clausewitz.

P.S. It assumes a little background on US military history but Wikipedia should be sufficient for any background on US wars you never heard of.

[David Duff]

Thanks, Hank, I need another book like a hole in the head but I have seen Weigley's name referenced in other military histories, so I had better get it. Incidentally, an enormous thread over at the Volokh Conspiracy on whether or not there was a real threat of a Japanese attack/invasion on the West Coast, the internment of American/Japanese and the ins and outs of Midway. I ventured in a couple of times but the heat of battle was too fierce and I beat a retreat!
http://volokh.com/posts/1219153336.shtml