"Something wrong with our bloody ships today, Chatfield"

Thus, the words of Adm. Beatty, commander of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the "Big Cats" of the Royal Navy in 1916, as he chased Hipper's equivalent German fleet at pell-mell speed south and in doing so took a savage mauling from the enemy guns which resulted in the loss of two ships.  It is easy, too easy, to criticise Beatty.  As I read the details of the opening moves in the Battle of Jutland it is obvious that all of Beatty's faults were laid bare in the white-hot heat of battle, but part of me holds back in wonder and sympathy at the unbelievably sudden and savage catechism of fire that he faced on that sullen afternoon in the North Sea.

Like all of his naval contemporaries, Beatty was born into the height of Pax Britannica and a world whose oceans were 'ruled' by the Royal Navy.  His service was burdened, I use the word deliberately, with the memory and the mythology of Nelson and Trafalgar.  When naval officers heard the expression 'the nation expects ...', they knew it expected another victorious battle of annihilation against the queen's foes in the Nelsonian tradition.  But by the end of the 19th century technology had changed everything.  Had Nelson lived  he, above all, would instantly have recognised it and changed his methods accordingly.  Too much was, and still is, made of Nelson's dash and verve and revolutionary tactics, and not nearly enough is made of his coldly calculated risk assessment based on immense technical knowledge of the inherent strength of wooden ships and the waywardness of smooth-bore cannon fire.  Even so, his reputation was both an icon and a burden to British admirals of the early 20th century.

Adm. Jacky Fisher had knocked some of the nonsense out of the Royal Navy and by the time WWI broke out it had come to terms with the technical nature of warfare with armoured, engine-driven ships moving at high speed and rifled guns capable of throwing a 2,000lb shell 12 miles with accuracy!  But in all those years between Trafalgar and Jutland, 1805 to 1916, the Royal Navy never fought a fleet action.  All their tactics and operational methods were entirely theoretical.  Thus, Beatty, like his contemporaries, took part in manouvres and fleet exercises which themselves were forced into half-understood change as technology raced ahead outpacing the plots and plans of mere men.  It was a peaceful life, although Beatty, like many naval officers, sought action on land by attachment to the army.  Meanwhile, the fleets sailed serenely on for year after year after year under a sun which never set on the British empire.

But then, suddenly, in the space of an hour, Beatty found himself personally in the middle of a maelstrom of fire and steel.  Remember, an army general, by and large, exists in a HQ well back from shot and shell, but an admiral on his bridge, with the eyes of his staff on him, with a fleet charging along behind at high speed waiting for orders, is in the middle of a fire storm with shells bursting, red-hot steel fragments whizzing around, casualties falling, fires breaking out - and he has to take instant decisions as he is forced to think in several dimensions of space and time.  There is no doubt, in my mind, at least, that Beatty did not quite pass this test, even as I accept that it was perhaps the severest test any man could undergo.  It was not that his nerve failed him, or anything like that, but simply that he lacked that extra piece of analytical ability which would have allowed him to take better decisions.

For me, the battle of Jutland, preceded as it was by the geo-politics of Europe in general and German evolution in particular, and the march into the 20th century with rapidly changing military technology, plus the social ethos and the plethora of larger than life characters, is the most fascinating of all battles.  The fact that, in a sense, it ended with a whimper not a bang, simply adds a delicious irony to the whole thing.  I say that with absolutely no disrespect to the brave men, German as well as British, who fought the battle.

 

Comments

[TDK]

Though I don't dispute the burden of the legacy of Nelson I think he was also weighted with the idea that he was "the only man on both sides who could lose the war in a single afternoon". If the Germans lost, then the blockade would remain and they would be contained in a land war. If Britain lost, then all sea connections including the Channel and Atlantic would be cut and with it the ability to prosecute total war.

[David Duff]

Hello, 'TDK'! I think you will find that remark was aimed, after the war, by Churchill at Jellicoe, not Beatty. It referred to the (still) controversial decision of Jellicoe to turn away from the German High Seas Fleet as it fled the scene because of his perceived danger of torpedoes and mines. Thus, according to his critics, he missed the chance of annihilating the German fleet in the Nelsonian/Trafalgar tradition. I intend to return to that in a later post. Not the least of the fascination in all of this lays in the differences in character and professionalism between Jellicoe and Beatty.

[dearieme]

"the brave men, German as well as British, who fought the battle." Including the future George VI - I'll spare you the obvious, tired joke.

[David Duff]

You risk the Tower, Sir, with that sort of a joke!

[TDK]

Quite right. I confused the two.

[JK]

Thoroughly enjoyed the piece David. Alas Poor Beatty (and Admirals in general). Reminds me of Guadalcanal. Hopefully the fellows administering the USN's History site won't come for me because I'm only pasting 'cause I'm uncertain the link will work. (Membership is supposed to be required and all that).

"The reputation of Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, the original expeditionary force commander, took a beating after the war. But a new study by John B. Lundstrom demonstrates how sound Fletcher really was and how a great many charges against him were unfounded. Fletcher provides an enduring lesson on how a senior leader can adjust to vast technological change beyond his personal experience. It is easily overlooked today that the first year of the Pacific war coincided almost exactly with the first year of widespread fleet use of radar. Moreover, the capabilities of carrier air groups evolved rapidly with new generations of aircraft.

Fletcher, a nonaviator, recognized he needed advice from officers with practical experience and knowledge. What earned him many enemies, however, was that he correctly perceived that the officers best fitted to provide that advice were far junior to those normally consulted by an admiral at his level. Fletcher reached down to squadron and air group commanders, lieutenant commanders, and even lieutenants. The naval aviator captains and commanders he passed over for advice became bitter critics."

http://www.usni.org/magazines/navalhistory/archive/story.asp?STORY_ID=2245

[David Duff]

Thanks, 'JK', but am I not right in thinking that Fletcher had a touch of the 'Jellicoes' at the end of Midway when he declined the chance to go haring off west after Yamamoto in much the same way that Jellicoe did when the German fleet turned away having had their 'T' well and truly crossed. The Nelsonian-Beatty-ites never forgave him. I think Fletcher and Jellicoe were quite right, and I say that with all the authority of an ex-corporal!

[JK]

You are of course correct where Midway is concerned, technically speaking. As it happens, there's a pretty fair "technical" reason (sadly I can't recall off the top of my head where I read it or if it was lectured me). But, if you read the link - you'll recall those newly developed fleet radars had a nasty habit of showing "ghost returns."

As I recall, those "ghost returns" were the subject of some debate after the fact. But, were I present at the time, I think it entirely possible that an Admiral JK could've come up with a few reasonably sounding justifications for not haring off across the Pacific after a "possibly sinking" Jap battle group. (Pardon if necessary - my lack of "pc").

[David Duff]

Indeed, and Fletcher's duty was precisely the same as Jellicoe's, forego the chance of fame and just preserve your fleet. Fletcher, I think without checking, was left with one and 'half' carriers at the end of the battle and carriers had just proved themselves to be the new Queens on the naval chess board.

[JK]

Thank goodness for the internets. Refreshing one's recollection is far easier performed in skivvies with beer near at hand than performing all the 'necessaries' prepping for a trip to the library. And this time, I won't be risking the ire of Naval authorities, however official Navy sources I prefer.

"As darkness fell, both sides took stock and made tentative plans for continuing the action. Admiral Fletcher, obliged to abandon derelict Yorktown and feeling he could not adequately command from a cruiser, ceded operational command to Spruance. Spruance knew the United States had won a great victory, but was still unsure of what Japanese forces remained and was determined to safeguard both Midway and his carriers."

http://modelshipwrights.kitmaker.net/modules.php?op=modload&name=SquawkBox&file=index&req=viewtopic&topic_id=140348&page=1

[David Duff]

Aha! When I wrote "Fletcher", of course, I meant "Spruance", as I explained to that chap in the shaving mirror this morning whose name escapes me! (Must take more water with it.)

[JK]

Advise that "chap" in the mirror (might he - no I suppose he's not Michael Jackson) though I've lost some detail, I generally have the gist - (Now 'Hank' do not engage here... please?) - of the timeline.

Midway was prior to Guadalcanal and even Spruance could not be sure a Jap sub "couldn't have been on-station" and a rifled big-gun naval engagement (which would surely have occurred at night) would've most probably, given away any advantage to protecting Singapore and by extension Australia... I wonder David - I understand you're engaged in a "battle-game?"

How's that going?

[David Duff]

Yes, 'JK', I tried that game "War in the Pacific" but it was rather disappointing - probably because I'm too thick and failed to understand the workings of it properly. However, yesterday was my birthday and 'SoD' bought me "Jutland", which as the name implies offers wargaming based on Big Ships with Big Armour and Bloody Big Guns! Had a quick look and it appears to be rather good - but I'm off to France next week so I will leave it until my return. Once I've learned it I will show all you 'Jacks' what an ex-corporal can do!