As you regulars will know, I have just finished two histories of the Korean war which left me with my chin sagging onto my chest! I had intended, with courage above and beyond the call of duty, to begin a history of the Vietnam war but, alas and alack, the biography of von Manstein intervened and has been followed up by David Glantz's very detailed version of Operation Barbarossa and, as I haven't even reached Moscow yet, you will understand my delay in turning to Vietnam. Well, to be absolutely honest, I was so shocked at the revelations disclosed in my books on Korea that I was sort of looking for any excuse not to touch Vietnam because I just know that is going to be even harder to take. Now, courtesy of Cafe Hayek, I have been pointed to a memoir printed in History News Network by Lt. Gen. Charles Cooper, USMC (Ret.)
The General describes a day in November 1965, very early in the Vietnam war, when he was on the staff of the senior admiral in the USN who was also, of course, a member of the Chiefs of Staff (CoS). All three Joint Chiefs plus their chairman, the Head of the CoS, were extremely reluctant to follow the strategy as laid down by Sec. of Defence, McNamara, which involved a huge increase in soldiers to put as many 'boots on the ground' as possible. The CoS, in their efforts to come to a sensible and if possible an agreed strategy, turned to the CIA for help. The General's description of the result is hilarious until you think of the blood and treasure about to be spilled:
The CIA was of little help, though it produced reams of text, executive summaries of the texts, and briefs of the executive summaries-all top secret, all extremely sensitive, and all of little use. The principal conclusion was that it was impossible to predict with any accuracy what the Chinese or Russians might do.
How much did they cost - even back in those days? Anyway, rather than commit to a protracted land war, an end to which they could not see, the CoS agreed that a better policy was to impose a naval blockade of North Vietnam and it's ports thus severing supplies from Russia, and mount a massive air campaign against Hanoi to force the North Vietnamese government to come to terms. (As far as I can tell from this memoir, there was no discussion on the possibility of simply walking away!) Anyway, the CoS had been pressing McNamara for weeks for a direct meeting alone with the president, Lyndon Baines Johnson, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief which was their right. After considerable delaying tactics they were eventually granted a meeting. It was Gen. Cooper's job, he was then of much lower rank, to bring in to the meeting a large map upon which the CoS could make their points. An easel was to be provided for this map and he would then leave this very secret and private meeting. However:
Precisely at two o'clock President Johnson emerged from the Oval Office and greeted the chiefs. He was all charm. He was also big: at three or more inches over six feet tall and something on the order of 250 pounds, he was bigger than any of the chiefs. He personally ushered them into his office, all the while delivering gracious and solicitous comments with a Texas accent far more pronounced than the one that came through when he spoke on television. Holding the map board as the chiefs entered, I peered between them, trying to find the easel. There was none. The President looked at me, grasped the situation at once, and invited me in, adding, "You can stand right over here." I had become an easel-one with eyes and ears.
What ensued defies belief! The Joint Chiefs, all experienced officers with active service credentials and at the very pinnacle of their various services, presented their reasoned case for a totally different approach to this war. They might have been right or they might have been wrong but what happened then is jaw-dropping:
Normally, time dims our memories-but it hasn't dimmed this one. My memory of Lyndon Johnson on that day remains crystal clear. While General Wheeler, Admiral McDonald, and General McConnell spoke, he seemed to be listening closely, communicating only with an occasional nod. When General McConnell finished, General Wheeler asked the President if he had any questions. Johnson waited a moment or so, then turned to Generals Johnson and Greene, who had remained silent during the briefing, and asked, "Do you fully support these ideas?" He followed with the thought that it was they who were providing the ground troops, in effect acknowledging that the Army and the Marines were the services that had most to gain or lose as a result of this discussion. Both generals indicated their agreement with the proposal. Seemingly deep in thought, President Johnson turned his back on them for a minute or so, then suddenly discarding the calm, patient demeanor he had maintained throughout the meeting, whirled to face them and exploded.
I almost dropped the map. He screamed obscenities, he cursed them personally, he ridiculed them for coming to his office with their "military advice." Noting that it was he who was carrying the weight of the free world on his shoulders, he called them filthy names-shitheads, dumb shits, pompous assholes-and used "the F-word" as an adjective more freely than a Marine in boot camp would use it. He then accused them of trying to pass the buck for World War III to him. It was unnerving, degrading.
Rather as the Joint Chiefs were at the time, I am left speechless. However, I make the same judgment against them as I do against their predecessors at the time of Korea - they should have had the guts to resign. Men together use profane language but for the most senior officers in their country to be harangued in that fashion should have resulted in their joint resignation. They didn't, and like Hitler's generals who were similarly treated, they must share the blame of what was to come.
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