As the regulars here will know, I have decided that I must try and rectify my almost total ignorance of Chinese affairs. To this end I have been pestering a friend of mine based in Singapore for a news site that would offer regular and informed reportage but the only one he suggested was behind a pay-wall (probably owned by 'Rupe', I suspect!) and I refuse to pay for my news. But then I remembered - yes, yes, I know, I should have done it from the off - to try that cornucopia of information, Google. Almost immediately I came across a truly fascinating book review from last year by Mr. Gordon G. Chang on the subject of Henry Kissinger's last book titled On China. This critique published last Summer on the World Affairs site is worth reading in its entirety but I will pick out some salient points here.
Mr. Chang, hitherto unknown to me, begins by praising Kissinger for his very acute study of Chinese history from ancient times to the present day but then ends it with a sting in the tail:
When Kissinger writes about China’s past, he displays a subtle understanding of the country. When he relays his conversations with the endlessly fascinating Mao Zedong, he dazzles us. When he considers the future, however, he flounders.
It takes a brave man to gainsay 'The World's Greatest Living Geo-Politician' but Mr. Chang does not hesitate. Whilst the book pretends to be about China, in fact, according to Mr. Chang, it is mostly about America's relations with contemporary China than which there is nothing more important facing the USA and, indeed, the rest of the world:
As Kissinger notes, “The relationship between China and the United States has become a central element in the quest for world peace and global well-being.”
As part of this quest, Kissinger articulates a vision of “a Pacific Community,” which he describes as “a region to which the United States, China, and other states all belong and in whose peaceful development all participate.” The concept, based on the Atlantic Community formed after the Second World War, would both “reflect the reality that the United States is an Asian power” and respond “to China’s aspiration to a global role.”
Mr. Chang, whose elegant side-swipes are delivered with the deadly accuracy of a black belt Kung Fu practitioner:
Nonetheless, in his more sober moments [my emphasis], Kissinger implies there is not much possibility of ever reaching across the world’s largest ocean to form this grand community.
At around this point warning bells started ringing in my head. Beyond Wiki, I know nothing of Mr. Chang and his background but back in the '40s and '50s there was a China lobby operating in the USA whose power was only exceeded by its malignancy. I don't know if it still exists in a 21st century form and nor do I know if Mr. Chang is part of it but if it is so then one needs to be aware that the hatred of these particular Chinese expatriates against the 'communist' rulers of China is deep and abiding. (Incidentally, you will have noticed the inverted commas around the word 'communist' because I do not believe that today that is a meaningful or accurate description of the current Chinese government.)
Back to Kissinger. In effect he advocates a live and let live policy:
A more likely development is what he calls “co-evolution,” which means that “both countries pursue their domestic imperatives, cooperating where possible, and adjust their relations to minimize conflict.” The most he says about this scaled-down goal is that the two sides should “attempt to elevate familiar crisis discussions into a more comprehensive framework that eliminates the underlying causes of the tensions.”
He absolutely wishes to avoid a constant state of tension and competition between America and China. He uses the histoirical example of the mounting tensions between Wilhemine Germany and Great Britain at the beginning of the 20th century:
[H]e devotes pages to analyzing what happens when great nations compete without inhibitions. For this, he focuses on the late-nineteenth-century story of the rise of more than three dozen sovereign German states, which formed first the loosely organized German Confederation and then a powerful nation in the heart of Europe, thereby irrevocably changing a once-stable European system.
Kissinger shows that the English saw that conflict with Germany was inevitable, not so much because of Berlin’s avowed intentions but because of its growing strength. The British Foreign Office, therefore, viewed formal German assurances as meaningless. As early as 1907, diplomacy became ineffective, and war almost inevitable. “The crisis of the system was inherent in its structure,” he writes in what are the most thoughtful pages in the book.
In my view, that situation in which fear feeds belligerence which then nurtures yet more fear and then even greater belligerence has to be avoided in Sino-American relations. It will not be easy. There are elements within both countries, and I suspect Mr. Chang is one of them, who will insist on a hardline being taken. Certainly there appears to be a faction (how big it is I do not know) within the Chinese leadership (using that word in its widest sense) whose aggressive tendencies can be seen in the way in which China aids enemies of America and actually undertakes large scale electronic attacks on American networks. But also, there are forces within China who seem to understand what Wilhemine Germany never did, that they will gain more by peaceful economic means than by war.
It is a fascinating subject which will dominate the 21st century. Mr. Chang's review of Kissinger's book is well worth reading because within it are the main strands of two entirely different approaches towards China. However, in reading Mr. Chang's strictures concerning Kissinger's policy suggestions it is worth knowing that in 2001 he wrote a book forecasting the demise of China by 2006 because of the gross and undisclosed debts of the big four nationalised Chinese banks. To be fair, his timing might be out but his prophecy could still come about. By coincidence, I have just finished another article, on which I will be posting later, reporting a speech by the outgoing Chinese prime minister (bet you don't know his name - nor did I!) in which he proposed changes leading to increased privatisation of China's banking system.
I urge you, read the review and then beg, borrow, steal or even buy Kissinger's book.
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