I am grateful to my e-pal, 'BOE', for reminding me of this auspicious date which has been the subject of a post by John Redwood this morning. Here are a few idle thoughts on the subject which come to you with the full authority and expertise of an ex-Corporal!
Clausewitz tells us that the first aim of a commander in the field is the destruction of the enemy's means of resistance which in most cases means his army. Clausewitz, of course, knew nothing of fleets and naval warfare but it is an indication of his brilliance that his precepts written to guide army commanders apply equally to admirals. What he was emphasising was the necessity for any commander not just to defeat the enemy by pushing him off the battlefield but to manouve in such a fashion that you surround him and then utterly destroy him. Armies which are allowed to escape even in the most pitiable condition (think Dunkirk 1940!) are likely to come back again later (think Normandy 1944).
Perhaps the greatest example of this on land was the Battle of Cannae in 216BC in which a small army led by Hannibal faced a huge army from Rome. By forming his forces into a convex shape and keeping his wings well back, Hannibal tempted the Romans to attack his centre which he gradualy withdrew under controlled pressure. At the right moment when the bulk of the Roman army was embroiled in what they thought was certain victory in the centre, he released his two wings who came around and in from behind. An entire Roman army ceased to exist, it was, to parphrase the words of Monty Python, 'an ex-army'! Even so, it is worth remembering that in the end, Rome won the war, a fact resolutely ignored by von Schlieffen, who was besotted with Cannae and whose plan for the coming war with France attempted to achieve the same thing.
I think Trafalgar was an even greater victory than Cannae because it was, like the Battle of Jutland which was to follow just over a hundred years later, a battle with absolutely crucial grand strategic implications far beyond the tally on the day of lost ships and men on either side. It is worth remarking that Bonaparte received the news of the destruction of the combined Franco-Spanish fleet at just about the time he had won the Battle of Austerlitz, known as the Battle of Three Emperors, in which he took on the combined armies of Russia and Austria and by 'doing a Cannae', that is, offering up a weakened centre and holding his wings back in reserve, he tempted his two imperial enemies to commit to the high ground in the centre before arching round behind them and utterly destroying their forces. Because Bonaparte never understood the grand strategic importance of navies he shrugged off the news of Trafalgar as he basked in the victory at Austerlitz. It was only as the years went on and the British naval grip of the seas around Europe began slowly to strangle the economic strength from his conquests that perhaps he began to appreciate the importance of control of the seas.
There is no doubt that Nelson truly rates as a genius in the annals of warfare. He combined two great virtues, tremendous knowledge in depth gained from decades of experience in the capabilities of the weapons at his disposal, plus, an equal expertise in understanding the capabilities and variabilities in different conditions, of the platforms (ie, the ships) for these weapons. Above that, and long before Clausewitz wrote his great volumes, Nelson already understood the absolute need to destroy an enemy.
Tonight, I shall quietly raise a glass to the memory of one of the great Captains of History.
Although I have read factual accounts of Trafalgar, the book that made most impression on me was Bernard Cornwell's book of that name. It was about the unlikely appearance of Richard Sharpe at sea!
One thing that has always impressed me was the clearness of the aim - to kill the French. No mucking about with not upsetting the b*****s, just kill them all!
Posted by: backofanenvelope | Monday, 21 October 2013 at 11:49
"Richard Sharpe at sea!" Typical bloody MoD, another cock-up in the paper work!
Posted by: David Duff | Monday, 21 October 2013 at 12:17
Austerlitz wasn't a Cannae, it was the diametric opposite: a manoeuvre of the central position. Bonaparte induced the Austrians and Russians to move apart, and then deliberately moved into the central position - actually inviting a Cannae against himself. He then held off one (the Russkies) with a small force, while he walloped the other (the Ozzers) with a large force, thereby gaining local advantage in numbers, even though outnumbered overall. With the Ozzers routed, he re-concentrated on the Russkies, who then outnumbered, legged it.
Lest we forget. My God, was that 8 years ago? "I wasted time, and now doth time waste me".
Also, I thought Bonaparte heard about Trafalgar while in Boulogne readying to invade Blighty, and the loss of Trafalgar was what made him abort the invasion, turn East, and start the Ulm / Austerlitz campaign?
SoD"
Posted by: Lawrence Duff | Monday, 21 October 2013 at 21:48
You're right, it was the inconclusive forerunner to Trafalgar, the Battle of Finisterre, that caused Boney to quit his invasion plans: -
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Cape_Finisterre_(1805)
For all the military geniuses around at the time, it was two bumbling poltroons, Calder and Villeneuve, who effectively saved Blighty, sealed Boney's fate, and dictated the future course of Europe.
Perhaps having two poltroons in charge is the secret to a successful future, in which case we seem in an ideal position to fulfil whatever European ambitions we might wish for (yeh, you saw that coming).
SoD
Posted by: Lawrence Duff | Monday, 21 October 2013 at 22:23
Yeah I'll admit you Brits had a coupla "important" Navy things - Trafalgar NOT being one of 'em:
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/top-five-naval-battles-all-time-9187
(But thanks for being in the one of 'em anyway.]
Posted by: JK | Tuesday, 22 October 2013 at 01:48
Lawrence, I think he received the news after the battle of Ulm whilst on his way towards Austerlitz. Bonaparte must have been biting his finger nails waiting for Villeneuve to get on with it because during the summer he was under pressure to do something about the Russian/Austrian alliance which was by then assuming dangerous potentialities. Also, let me remind you that he deliberately withdrew his main forces from the central heights at Austerlitz precisely to induce his enemies to commit themselves to it - much as Hannibal did to the Romans at Cannae and hence my comparison.
JK, thanks for that link, very interesting and I would hesitate to cross swords with such an eminent scholar who has forgotten more about naval history and strategy than I know! However, I do rate Trafalgar as "decisive" even though ten years were to pass before final victory. Apart from the slow but relentless strangling of the European economy by blockade, it also allowed the British to transport armies to Spain thus opening another front.
Similarly, I am surprised that the writer did not consider Midway in his list. Again, in my view decisive, but only over the long term.
Posted by: David Duff | Tuesday, 22 October 2013 at 10:45
"Also, let me remind you that he deliberately withdrew his main forces from the central heights at Austerlitz precisely to induce his enemies to commit themselves to it - much as Hannibal did to the Romans at Cannae and hence my comparison."
Still gotta disagree with that. The valley in Napoleon's centre was filled with fog, which disguised his main force, is correct. But the "false weakness" he displayed to induce the Russkies and Ozzers to separate was his right flank. This flank lead South to Vienna and was his supply line. He also knew there was a corps coming up that route to support him later. But he calculated that the Ozzers would be tempted to attack deep to his right to cut him off from Vienna. He calculated right, and when the Ozzers parted company by a sufficient distance from the Russkies, the Austerlitz sun rose and burnt off the fog, and Boney's two crack divisions came marching out of the valley, like legions of zombie soldiers from hell, and up the Pratzen heights to take the enemy's central position.
Text book ruse and manoeuvre of the central position; game over in 5 hours.
SoD
Posted by: Lawrence Duff | Tuesday, 22 October 2013 at 13:14
I don't disagree with any of that but first and foremost he did what no other commander would have even contemplated - he abandoned the Pratzen Heights at his centre which absolutely dominates the countryside and this empty space drew his enemies in.
Now get on with your work!
Posted by: David Duff | Tuesday, 22 October 2013 at 13:36
Trafalgar was a momentous day for the British and our opponents still have an antipathy towards us. But fuck them they lost. Then Waterloo and fuck them they lost again. The Frogs and the Spanyards still have a problem with freedom and all sorts. They do not seem to like our Queen who does not bend to the Vatican whims. That is why we are British. So get it up them with a bayonet in a nice British way!
Posted by: i | Wednesday, 23 October 2013 at 00:55
Calm down, Jimmy, "it's all blood under the bridge" now!
Posted by: David Duff | Wednesday, 23 October 2013 at 08:55