The 'dismal science' at war

I am no economist, as my bank manager will confirm, but there is no denying that economics is a huge factor in warfare if not always the decisive one as, for example, the truly 'David and Goliath' struggle for Vietnam proved when a peasant army on bicycles humbled the mighty United States of America.  But then again, surely you do not need a degree in economics to judge that the Japanese in 1941 were stark, raving bonkers when they did the equivalent of the skinny, little guy kicking sand in the face of a sleeping Charles Atlas!  Even so, it was a long, hard slog that took a couple of atom bombs to bring to a conclusion.

I raise this somewhat abstruse subject because I have been somewhat startled by Mr. James Holland in his latest book(*) on WWII.  Hitherto, without really thinking about it, I had assumed that Britain was, so to speak, the skinny, little guy being kicked by a huge Germanic Charles Atlas and that it was entirely due to British pluck (and a certain amount of crafty guile) that saw us through to victory.  Not entirely so, according to Mr. Holland writing on the situation in 1939.

For all [Hitler's] talk of Britain and France bluffing, the one who was really doing so was Hitler.  The carefully orchestrated parades, the even more carefully managed showreels of German troops and tanks and skies thick with aircraft, were, to a very large extent, a projection of military might rather than a representative of the reality.  Germany was by no means ready for all-out war.  It did not have enough tanks, vehicles or trained soldiers and certainly not enough natural resources to carry out anything more than a short, sharp campaign against a massively inferior enemy: Germany possessed little iron ore, no oil, no copper, tungsten, bauxite or rubber, and, crucially, did not have enough land, sufficiently farmed, to fulfil the food requirements of both the population and the massive military.  Few, if any, nations had access to all the resources needed for war-making, but unlike Britain and France, Germany's merchant fleet was small and access to global resources was limited.

Meanwhile, for all the concerns of men like Churchill and Général George, the disparity in air power was not as great as they feared.  In Britain, aircraft production was almost on a par with that of Germany; monthly British output was 662 aircraft compared with 691 in Germany.  France was one of the leading powers in the world and had a sizeable standing army, with the administration and infrastructure in place to mobilise more than a hundred divisions in a matter of days should it come to war.

It was true that Britain's army was small by comparison, but it was growing rapidly.  Within the Royal Navy and the Air Force, rearmament had been going on since 1935, and Britain now had the world's first fully co-ordinated air defence system.  It also had the world's largest Navy by some margin and stood at the centre of the biggest global trading network the world had ever seen.  It was rich - the richest country in Europe, even after the depression - had the kind of access to resources Germany could only dream of, and it was, and had been for some time, the world's largest armaments exporter.   With its Empire and Dominions, it also had access to an unprecedented amount of manpower.  In almost every way, Britain was better equipped for a major conflict than Germany. 

Hmmmn, so there goes the myth of 'plucky little Britain'!  The fact is that we should have wiped the floor with them - but we didn't, in fact, in 1940 the German army wiped the floor with us!  Of course, you could say that there-in lies the difference between the 'operational' and the 'strategic'.  Yes, the Germans chased us out of France but that was only 'round one' and the fight was scheduled for 15 rounds! 

Even so, it's worth wondering why we were quite so dismal and useless in those early days?  Part of the answer lies in that fine old tradition of utter uselessness that is now, after several centuries, almost an honourable tradition in the higher ranks of the British army.  It takes a long war to rid ourselves of the ninnies at the top and replace them with men of intelligence.  But also there is, I suggest, another factor.  We Brits are just not that warlike!  We go through the motions from time to time and a few men are killed and wounded and a few flags are waved but full on militarism simply does not flow through our bloodstream in the same way that it does in other countries.  You only have to compare our most important annual military parade, the Trooping of the Colour, which reduces 'militarism' to the level of toy soldiers!  Then compare that with the gross pomp and circumstance of the ludicrous parades organised by 'Vlad the Impaler' or 'Kim Il Suks' (or whatever his name is) in North Korea.  Just like Hitler they will end up believing their own circus-contrived agit-prop - and that's when the trouble will start.

 

(*) The War in the West: Germany Ascendant 1939-1941

 

Comments

[Whitewall]

You think maybe ole Vlad might start muttering about some poor put upon Russian minorities somewhere in NATO, say, one of the former eastern members of his old empire? Vlad the Uniter and protector of all the Slavs.

[Hank]

David

Some thoughts.

Until the 1930's the "100,000" man German army, unhindered by considerations of using equipment they did not have, put a lot of thought in how to use equipment they might have someday.

The Anglo-French forces in 1940 were not so much out fought as out maneuvered. Every one, including the Germans thought that in a new western front war the Germany would use a new and improved Schlieffen Plan. When the Anglo-French forces deployed the German General staff saw weak spot they could attack and cut off the north west portion of the Anglo French. Solider for solider and small unit for unit the both the British and French mostly held their own.

As a result of that campaign HM's armed forces were in a bad way for two years or so.

The psychological impact along with the loss of most of the equipment and personnel, created much of the German superiority myth.

[David Duff]

Without a doubt, 'Whiters', so if I lived in the Baltic states I would be exceedingly nervous!

It's true, Hank, that the Anglo-French forces were out-manoeuvred but it's worth remembering that the Germans were less than creative with their *first* plan which was a re-run of the old Schlieffen plan and which everyone expected. It was only when a small recce plane was shot down and one of the officers on board was found to have a complete copy of the German plan that Hitler turned in some desperation to Manstein who suggested what he had always thought was best - an armoured thrust through the Ardennes.

As our mutual 'friend', Gen. Dupuy, makes clear neither our fighting troops or yours ever came close to the efficiency of their German counterparts. Nothing to do with courage, everything to do with rigorous, well-thought out doctrine and training.

[JK]

I'm thinking - yeah I know - David, Hank's got more to his point but probably, somewhat like me, "with frost comin' on" time is limited. But very unusually .. heck perhaps a first .. I'm gonna steal from both you and your cited author.

"It also had the world's largest Navy by some margin and stood at the centre of the biggest global trading network the world had ever seen."

That mighta been the advantage it really might have, had it not been for the skinny guy. (But then we wouldn't have the tidy way we enjoy deploying the term "WW.")

[john malpas]

All rather glib. Germany was defeated by general winter and the vaste numbers of russians but it didn't come easy.
As for the japanese how was it thst there were so many bloody battles if they were really weak. Iwo jima gave the USA thought.
Remember the winner was the USA. The British Empire melted away.

[David Duff]

"Glib"! Have a care, Sir, you are addressing one of the finest strategic minds in the country. I would remind you that when I was promoted to Corporal it was 'substantive' not 'acting'!

However, John. I would also remind you that Russia was in an equally precarious situation to begin with and Moscow was saved - just! - because the Germans lacked the automotive power. I have just read the next chapter of Mr. Holland's book which details the utter shambles of the German automotive industry - scores of different factories producing scores of *different* vehicles none of which shared common spare parts and a lack of trained mechanics to repair them. It was a shambles, the Germans were fighting a 19th century war!

[Oswald Thake]

"Substantive, not acting?" Dammit, outranked!

[AussieD]

G'day Duffers,

For a good potted history of the Brits at war I'd suggest Warrior Race by Lawrence James

[David Duff]

Quite so, 'Thakers', and it only took me seven years!

Now look here, AussieD, I'm not talking to you Aussies after your impertinence in embarrassing us Anglos at the very home of rugby yesterday. Appalling manners!

[AussieD]

At the risk of being insensitive [a trait for which I have occasionally been falsely accused] I must say that after recent matches between the Great and Glorious Wallabies and Engeland where some prat kept kicking field goals instead of heading for the try line your lot deserved a walloping. Just to remind your lot what the game is all about of course - nothing malicious.

[TDK]

I can't recall who said it, but (and assume I paraphrase) "Britain starts every war ready to fight the last". The consequence of losing is that it makes you think about what went wrong - minds are changed - new ways emerge. In general Britain has won most of it's wars and so we get complacent.

I don't think your main point about the economic result is so little known (at least amongst historians). I would tend to agree that the general public (if they think about it at all) assume the Germans were very productive.

To take a few points. Britain alone outproduced Germany in fighter production during the Battle of Britain. At the start of the Battle of France the French had more tanks and planes than Germany. Clearly the issue was not decided by simple numbers.

You'll also find in the history books that British economists of the time thought Germany unable to sustain it's war effort. They thought the economy would collapse of its own accord.

Another fascinating fact (which again I can't locate) is that German War production in the First World was greater than in the Second.

Against all this is the fact that the French army collapsed in weeks - it seems the soldiers hadn't seen the GDP figures!

[David Duff]

Thanks, TDK, and you're right, the historians knew all about German economic weakness, it's just that I haven't read a book before in which it was stressed quite so much. I am just reading about the German officer who was placed in charge of the German automotive industry in a desperate attempt to make it more efficient - worst job in the war! Also, it makes it more understandable that German output actually *rose* during the bombing campaign because, I suppose, they started at such a low ebb.

[H]

Adam Tooze - the Wages of Destruction - makes a similar point. The Nazis ran into recurrent balance of payments problems in the 1930s, with the result that their rearmaments programme was in constant state of 'stop-go'. If Britain and France had punched their economic weight militarily, WWII would have been a rerun of WWI, with eventual German defeat in a war of attrition which they could not fight, because they lacked access to non-European resources.

[David Duff]

Dammit, 'H', that is the book I should have read yonks ago and then I wouldn't have been quite so surprised by German economic feebleness in WWII. Now, when I can find where the 'Memsahib' has hidden my Kindle ...

[monoi]

My grandfather was in the French artillery. Was made to go hither and tither, never seeing any actual war (probably a good thing since I'm here!) and then deserted when all was done.

Also, I was told when visiting the tank museum in Saumur that although French tanks were far superior, they had no radios. Which is quite an impediment for various obvious reasons. Not obvious enough for the people at the top apparently.

[David Duff]

Now look here, Monoi, we can't have you French chappies coming onto our turf - it's we Brits who do 'stoopid', it's our speciality.

Mind you, deserting *after* the war was over is pretty dumb - but thinking about, it I bet there was a mademoiselle involved - your grandmother, perhaps?!