Look, don't blame me, blame Channel 4

I know I have dwelt on this subject before but, as you all know well, it is not in my nature to be a bore - sorry, didn't quite catch that!  Last night Channel 4 broadcast a programme on the Battle of Jutland promising to expose hitherto unknown secrets.  They didn't, at least nothing that radically altered what I already know of the battle.  However, it was a good reminder that the 100th anniversary is approaching on May 31st/June 1st and it has prodded me into writing this.

I would rate the battle of Jutland as one of the most fascinating battles ever fought.  It had all the ingredients.  First, it was a war winning/losing battle on which the future of Europe and the world rested.  Second, it was the culmination of a frighteningly rapid development of technology the impact of which could only be guessed at.  Finally, the personalities of two of the main players were the stuff of which a William Shakespeare would have made a great play.

It was under 100 years since the first iron-clad steam ship had been launched at sea.  From modest beginnings warships developed into behemoths with huge armour-plating, massive guns capable of hurling exploding shells over huge ranges and driven at high speed by new diesel-powered rotary engines.  From the accession of (the half English) Wilhelm 11 to the German/Prussian throne it was only a matter of time before his rank detestation of all things English would lead to rising tensions and the threat of war.  Happily, in those late Victorian times the British tried as hard as possible to keep clear of European wrangles - a lesson there for the EU-lovers of today!  However, when the Kaiser determined that Germany would build a bigger and better navy than the British then 'glorious isolation' was ended.

The Germans built a massive fleet which they based at Wilhelmshaven on the North Sea.  It copied the British model in being formed mainly of Battleships - big armour, big guns but slow - and Battlecruisers - equally big guns but with much thinner armour and therefore much faster.  Immediately on the outbreak of war the British slapped on a Napolean-era blockade.  They had moved their Battleships, with overall Fleet Commander Admiral Jellicoe, to Scapa Flow in order to prevent the Germans from sneaking out of the North Sea but kept their Battlecruisers, under Admiral David Beatty, further south in the Firth of Forth (see main map).  This division of forces was to lead to problems.

 

However, it was not just the different locations that were a problem.  It was the different temperaments of both men that was to add to the difficulties.  Jellicoe was your archetypal, close-lipped, proper, Victorian, British gent, a man of few words but a deep thinker on naval strategy and tactics.  Beatty was an incredibly brave man but also hot-headed and a bit of a cad.  It was probably a relief to both of them to be stationed well apart but that did not auger well for them to work together.

The famous 'Room 40' at the Admiralty picked up the German signals traffic which warned the British that after nearly two years of hiding up in Wilhelmshaven the Germans were coming out in force.  Immediately, Beatty was ordered to race across the North Sea to find out what the Germans were up to.  At the same time Jellicoe ordered the lumbering British battle fleet to move down to the south.  Beatty bumped into his German equivalent, Hipper, who promptly turned south chased by Beatty.  In the exchange of gunfire several British warships blew up.  Partly this was due to the pre-war practice of holding gun shooting competitions in which the captains who could fire first were highly praised.  This led many of them to quietly drop the safety procedures which kept explosive charges well separated from shells inside the guts of the ships.

The charge to the south ended abruptly when Beatty realised that Hipper had led him on to the approaching German Battleship fleet.  At that point he led his ships into a 180 degree turn and raced off up north with the German fleet lumbering along behind him.   In his haste, however, he ordered his ships to conduct their turns at the same place one after the other thus allowing the Germans to pinpoint the turning point and plaster it with shells (See top right map.)  More important than all of that was the fact that as he raced north Beatty forgot to keep Jellicoe in the picture as to what was happening, in fact after a while the superior speed of Beatty's cruisers took him out of sight of the Germans - not exactly what was required of a commander whose main duty was reconnaissance!

Jellicoe was now faced with an exquisite conundrum.  His fleet was sailing in groups of squadrons but he had to deploy them into line in order to 'cross the enemy's T' - but because of Beatty's laxity he had no clear idea of what course the enemy were on and if he got it wrong it would be his 'T' that was crossed by the Germans.  Remaining totally calm - despite the anxieties in his mind - he ordered the British fleet to deploy in line to the left and shortly there-after it became clear that Germans under the command of Admiral Scheer had sailed straight into the trap - their 'T' had been well and truly crossed which meant they were approaching the British in line, one ship at a time, whilst the British could fire broadsides from all of their ships at once and thus 'chew up the line'!  Scheer, instantly recognizing his dangerous predicament carried out an emergency manoeuvre in which he ordered all his ships to do the naval equivalent of a handbrake turn and head off as fast as possible in the opposite direction.

It was at this point, with the Germans in headlong flight and the British in line behind them that Jellicoe took his toughest decision.  The likes of Beatty and an enormous number of 'know-nothings' insisted that Jellicoe, in true Nelsonian style should have ordered a general pursuit and chewed his way down the retreating German line taking out one ship after another.  Instead, as night fell, Jellicoe played safe and steered his line of ships south keeping his fleet between the German fleet and their sanctuary in Wilhelmshaven.  He, unlike the ignorant wiseacres who were to criticize him after the event, knew all too well that the fleeing German ships were likely to roll mines off the stern of their ships and one mine could cripple a Battleship.  Also their small but fast torpedo ships could dart in and out loosing off an array of torpedoes which could, in effect, break the back of the British fleet whose continued existence was absolutely crucial t0 the British war effort.

In my view, Jellicoe was a great naval commander, up there with Nelson, and Beatty was a prat!

 

Comments

[Whitewall]

A nice summary David. Some of this sounds like the approach of Nelson to the French Fleet off Trafalgar during another age. A perpendicular approach, which was kind of new at the time. Tall ships or diesel engines, still it is positioning, timing and speed, skill and plain old "pluck" in the end.

[David Duff]

Sort of, Whiters, but at Trafalgar, Nelson deliberately allowed the Franco-Spanish fleet to, in effect, cross TWO of his Ts. He divided the British fleet into two separate lines which he sent towards two separate points in the enemies line, at roughly one third and two thirds down the line. But of course, he was operating in the age of sail and the age of smooth-bore cannon. By breaking the enemy line at one third it meant that their vanguard under wind conditions was forced to sail on before trying, desperately slowly to tack back to the action. Thus, at a stroke he had reduced the enemy effectives by a third.

Also, (like Jellicoe in the next century) he understood the technology of his era. Smooth-bore cannon were notoriously inaccurate especially when mounted on wooden ships pitching and rolling at sea, so he was quite prepared to take his chances as his two Ts were crossed. The other great tactical advantage was that as each of his ships passed through the enemy line the gun crews were able to fire, at point blank range, down the *length* of the ship to the left and then race over to the gun on the other side and fire that down the length of the ship to the right. Raking shots like that produced terrific damage and casualties.

I'm glad I was at neither battle!

[Richard]

David,
I think it is a mistake to dismiss Beatty as a complete prat. Agreed, he misjudged things appallingly at Jutland and the fact that we suffered considerably more losses than the Germans was entirely down to him.

However, after replacing Jellicoe, his return of the Navy to the Nelsonic principles of commanders thoroughly understanding their commander's intentions and using their initiative to achieve them was surely the correct approach. Jellico was one of the most brilliant and inspiring admirals we have ever had, but it cannot be denied that he over regulated, over centralised and was far too reluctant to delegate.

Also, one shouldn't forget that Beatty was one of the finest first sea lords that we have ever had, and perhaps his most valuable service to the nation was the fact that he fought the politicians tooth and nail over naval cuts and the fact that we still had a navy worth the name at the start of WW2 was almost entirely down to him.

With regard to our vulnerable battlecruisers I would argue that the overall concept was correct, but design and doctrine left a lot to be desired. They were simply not robust enough to take on any serious opposition. Interestingly, the Germans had a good hard look at the class and then produced their own which were a considerable improvement on ours. While sacrificing range and crew comfort, they were nearly as well armoured as a battleship and could take a huge pounding before succumbing. They were also fast.

Take particular note that SMS Goeben, a German battlecruiser was arguably the single most successful warship in history. She evaded British and French pursuit and then brought Turkey into the conflict ON THE WRONG SIDE which lengthened the war BY A GOOD TWO YEARS. The closure of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles that followed denied Russia her only warm water trade route and the shortages that ensued were a contributory cause to the Russian revolution that followed. The Goeben, a battle cruiser, was truly a ship that changed history.

[Cuffleyburgers]

thank you Duffers very interesting post.

The other vital point informing Jellicoe's decision was that the consequneces for Britain of a defeat were rather worse than those for Germany.

I would take slight issue with your remark that the Kaiser hated all things British. He loved the Navy which is why he made his own, and I think he was simply such an utter dick that he welcomed the opportunity start a war to give it a run out. Obviously there were all sorts of other issues as well such as the fact that Germany considered herself surrounded and their analysis indicated that is was then or never, but my own opinion is that the Kaiser was an infantile twat and regarded it all rather as other boys play with trainsets.

[David Duff]

Gentlemen, let me confess instantly that my knowledge of Beatty is mostly centred on his conduct at Jutland. However, was interesting to find out, via the TV programme, that he ensured that charts were altered after the war to throw blame on Jellicoe and enhance his own role. Dammit, the man was an utter cad! In comparison, Jellicoe, despite the vilification, remained completely tight-lipped until his death.

Also, I intended no criticism of the Battlecruiser concept which was pushed through with help from Adm. Fisher (another of my 'heroes'). It was exactly right for the Royal Navy of the time which had to patrol the global seas to protect British interests. However, the tactical concept behind it was to provide a *very fast* big ship with *big guns* which could track down enemy raiders and then stand off at a distance and sink them. Also, of course, they filled a reconnaissance role which would keep a fleet commander informed of enemy movements - a role that Beatty totally cocked-up at Jutland.

Jellicoe was not a great communicator but partly that was due to his low opinion of most of his fellow naval officers - and if Beatty was a typical, thoughtless, gung ho, up-and-at-'em type then you can understand his reluctance. Hardly any of them understood afterwards that his decision not to go charging after the German fleet was because he understood the essential aim of the conflict - that it was not absolutely necessary to win, it was only essential not to lose! Having several battleships sunk by ten shilling torpedoes and mines would have been a war-losing disaster. The proof is that the Germans sneaked back into harbour and never came out again!

[David Duff]

Cuffers, your assessment of the Kaiser is about right. He was technically, I think, psychotic with a deeply peculiar love/hate/envy feeling towards the British. Needless to say, his attempt to out-build the Brits and produce a world-dominating nave of his own was a disaster - thank God! - because it diverted huge financial and man-power resources from his army to his navy. Would we and the French have held back the German army in 1914 if he had enjoyed the use of, say, another 5 army Corps?

[Cuffleyburgers]

Oh and Beatty - how managed to sink a steamer on one of the cataracts in the Nile during the River campaign - the only one that was lost.

So yes, I think your opinion is about right - bit useless, but a jolly good swimmer!!

[Andrew Duffin]

Thanks for the summary, David; I need to learn more about this, because apart from its historical importance, my grandfather was there as a leading stoker on HMS Calliope, so I have a personal interest in the fact that he survived!

(Prior to Jutland, he had applied to his CO to be moved to a different (ie less dangerous) duty, but was told to stay put because his skills were too valuable. I have the CO's letter advising him of this refusal - fascinating stuff.)

[David Duff]

Andrew, before you 'do a Beatty' and rush off for a book on Jutland, please begin by reading "Dreadnought" by Robert K. Massie which is up there vying for a place in my best ever history book list! Then, read up on Jutland.

[JK]

Thanks Mr. Duffin, very much at the news of your Grandfather's importance at Jutland - and his CO's great good sense refusing the transfer. Examples of such sense during the period not exactly, abounding.

Salutes all round for the Royal Navy - roota toot toot!

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Calliope_(music)