More war - sorry!

I have already provided as close as I can achieve in giving a rave review of the late Robin Neillands' book "The Battle of the Rhine 1944" but now I must 'ice the cake', as it were, by praising his other WWII history "The Battle of Normandy 1944".  I am still only part way through it but it confirms my opinion that Neillands, although not a historian in the classical sense, is a superb chronicler of WWII, perhaps the very best and my reading goes back to the mid-'50s and Chester Wilmot's "The Struggle for Europe" and innumerable books since then.  Neillands was a Brit but never once do I detect any national bias in his telling of these dramatic events.  Yes, he lays into Patton for being the total arsehole that he was but equally he damns Montgomery for his manifold personal faults which only harmed the joint cause everyone was fighting for.

However, part way through the Normandy volume he raises a subject which has barely impinged on me despite all my reading and that is the exceedingly awkward and tricky strategic problem faced by Rommel and his immediate superior von Rundstedt.  It is worth pondering because it sums up the sort of diabolical choices which face all commanders of all times prior to battle - do we follow Plan A or Plan B?

In late '43 and early '44, the Germans were well aware that an invasion of NW Europe via the French coast was imminent.  Rommel was convinced that the allies needed to be held on the beaches and absolutely everything should be hurled at them before they could bring ashore their armour and their big guns.  He was probably right but one factor he did not take sufficiently into account, possibly because he was a German army officer with little or no experience of naval warfare, was that the huge resources of the Royal Navy would be crammed in as close as possible to the shoreline and their guns would blow beach defences to pieces.

Von Rundstedt, by contrast, believed that the German reserves should be held back until such time as it was absolutely clear exactly where the main invasion was taking place before they were released to crush the enemy and push them back into the sea.  In the meantime, he insisted that all the ports should be heavily defended in order to deny them to the allies and to cut down their sources of resupply.

Happily, as an ex-Corporal (substantive, mind!), that sort of decision-making was way above my pay-grade.  In pondering the issue, once again I join those who with far greater qualifications than me constantly offer prayers of gratitude to Hitler's stupidity in invading Russia, and Russia's incredible endurance in tying down the bulk of the German army on the steppes of Russia!

 

 

Comments

[Richard]

If the Japanese had been allies in more than name, the Germans in general, and Rommel in particular, would have profited from the lessons that the Jap military learned the hard way with regard to defence against seaborne invasion. Initially, in places such as Tarawa, they took the approach that Rommel favoured, which was to fight the Americans at the beaches and prevent them from landing altogether. That didn't work out too well, and when the Americans hit Okinawa, they had come up with plan b, which was to let them land, and stop them at the main line(s) of resistance, which had been set up inland. This of course tallied with what von Rundstedt was thinking.

Unfortunately for the Americans, the Japs were absolute masters at defensive fighting. Their bunkers were brilliantly sighted with interlocking fields of fire, they were linked by networks of tunnels, which meant that they kept reappearing in positions the Americans thought they had cleared, and their camouflage and fire discipline were world class.

Much as I admire Rommel, I have to go with von R. All I can say is thank God the Jerries didn't pay too much attention to what the Japs were doing on the other side of the World.!!!

[David Duff]

Thanks for that, Richard. I must confess to my ignorance when it comes to Japanese military strategic and tactical thinking although it became very clear that they were masters of defence. Again, through gritted teeth, I thank God for the A-bomb which saved countless American lives by obviating the need for an invasion of the Japanese mainland.

[AussieD]

saved countless American lives

And also British and Empire/Commonwealth lives. Remember there was a campaign in Burma which was intended to push on into Siam [Thailand] who were co-belligerants of the Japanese and then on into Malaya to Singapore. Refer to Sir William Slim's book Defeat into Victory which is the story of the "Forgottten Fourteenth Army". Likewise Borneo where the Australians were the principal military force.

Without the Atomic bomb who knows how many allied military and civilian lives would have been lost.

[Whitewall]

Just after the end of WW2 and into the 1950s I heard my Dad and his fellow vets who served in the Pacific, refer to the "Yellow Menace" that had fallen under Communism. This I took to be a blanket term for Orientals as we called them way back when and included Japanese people. While the A-Bomb took care of Japan and rightly so, many WW2 vets we knew suggested the Bomb was the ultimate answer to the "Yellow Menace". I had an uncle who served in the Far East as it was known then, usually meaning China/Burma. He didn't return home until 1947. His solution to the Yellow Menace was pretty much the same.

[JK]

AD's comment prompts me to acknowledge with no small gratitude as I have alluded to in some earlier comment as, without the equal contributions from the Coastwatchers - Guadalcanal would have been nigh on impossible.

(Apologies for the convoluted syntax - but it's early dammit!)

Its exceedingly (at this hour) difficult to find a proper link:

"Most of this intelligence came from Australian Coastwatchers. These were intelligence operatives based on the scattered Pacific islands, whose role was to keep an eye out for Japanese activity. Based in places such as Bougainville and New Georgia, they radioed in reports of incoming Japanese planes. This allowed the Cactus flyers to get into the air before the Japanese arrived."

https://www.warhistoryonline.com/world-war-ii/cactus-air-force-guadalcanal-mm.html

https://audioboom.com/posts/6212540-the-conquering-tide-war-in-the-pacific-islands-1942-1944-war-in-the-pacific-islands-1942-1944-by-ian-w-toll-part-1-of-6

Too, without bearing in mind Australia's role directing the USN it is equally difficult to appreciate the gravity of Richard's comment.

[JK]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Coral_Sea