My last thoughts on the Normandy campaign

Having finished Robin Neillands' definitive history of The Battle of Normandy 1944 about which I have bored on and off for some time, I have a few final thoughts.

It is to state "the bleedin' obvious" if I repeat the fact that this was the most incredibly complex and dangerous campaign ever fought.  First it was necessary to shift millions of soldiers across a sea plus all their weaponry, and rations and spare parts and hospitals and fighting vehicles and ammunition and so on and on and on with the aim of gaining a lodgement against a determined foe on a defended shore.  To add potential grit to what needed to be a well-oiled machine, there was a multiplicity of national armies and, "as any fule do no", allies can often turn out to be more trouble than the enemy!  And yet ... and yet ... we did it!

In retrospect, it seems to me that the greatest 'ally' we had was Adolph Hitler.  In this, as in so many other military activities, he proved that making him a Corporal in WWI was a step too high for his military ability, Lance Corporal was all he deserved!  Virtually every decision he took during this absolutely crucial campaign was wrong.  Mind you, in making the biggest mistake of them all by refusing to release massive armoured forces from the Pas de Calais area he was 'ably assisted' by those crafty Brits who convinced him by subterfuge that Normandy was merely a distraction and that the real attack would be across the narrowest part of the Channel.  In the very early stages of the invasion those huge German reserves, if released, would have made the entire enterprise exceedingly dangerous.  It is also worth bearing in mind that if the invasion had failed, the pressure to use the new and very secret atomic weapons in Europe would have been enormous.

So Hitler helped but even so the battle had to be fought and exactly how we were to do that would be crucial.  At this point enter General Bernard Law Montgomery, one of the very best generals produced by Britain since the Duke of Wellington.  Even so, he was a man and he too had his fault-lines.  As a strategist and a fighting general he was superb and if this war had only concerned Britain and its army he would rank with the highest.  But alas, this was a war fought with allies, one of which, the USA, was immensely more powerful in virtually all respects than Britain.  It was here that Montgomery's personal failings - bombastic, rude, peremptory and convinced of his own strategic brilliance - were to cause him great difficulties.

The fact that Montgomery had been chosen to command the entire invasion force was, when you think about it, an exceedingly generous gesture on the part of the Americans, as was their acceptance of Montgomery's strategic plan.  It did not play well in the American press which, just like today, plays an enormous role in their 'body politic'.  Fortunately, Eisenhower had the good sense - then! - to see that 'Monty' was by far the most qualified to plan and then lead and fight the battle.  Mind you, once the battle was over, American impatience would not allow this British seniority to continue and the command structure was altered.  To be fair, once he knew the way the wind was blowing, 'Monty' volunteered to serve under Gen. Bradley if, as would have been sensible, Bradley had taken over as Commander-in-Chief, with Eisenhower remaining as the titular overall theatre commander.  Here, Eisenhower made an error by insisting that not only would he be the overall 'Grand Panjandrum' for the entire European front but he would also be the C-in-C of the forces in NW Europe.  This was beyond the capabilities of one man.  He was neither qualified for that double position nor was he an experienced fighting commander - as events were to prove on the approach to the Rhine.

In the meantime, of course, and with all the inevitability of a group of strong-minded, egotistical - I am tempted to say 'ego-testical! - generals  desperate to make their mark in history, the internal warfare at the top became almost fierce as that with the enemy.  The fact that they were from different nations with some bad blood in their history did not help.  If Montgomery was bad, Patton was worse!  However, the strategic plan for the capture of Normandy was Montgomery's and allowing for the numerous glitches and confusions and setbacks that always and forever blight military plans made in the peace and quiet of HQ map-rooms, the fact is that his plan worked!  As Mr. Neillands repeats endlessly in his book, the pity of war in this particular example was the post-war publication of numerous ultra chauvinistic so-called 'histories' in which, instead of victory being celebrated, old scores were settled!

Finally, a word about the actual fighting.  It was ferocious!  My admiration for all the men, friends and foes, who fought in Normandy is impossible to express.  Unfortunately, it is a fact that the Germans were very much better at fighting than the allies.  Not that they were braver, just that they had been trained by officers who really understood tactics in this new, modern age.  Once again, I would urge you to read the American Col. T. N. Dupuy's superlative history of German militarism, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff 1807-1945.  Fortunately, in Normandy in 1944, Hitler refused to trust his generals and that was a gift he kept on giving to the bloody end.  Of course, the fact that the 'ams' kept on fighting the 'pros' speaks volumes for their courage and perseverance.

I salute them!

 

 

 

Comments

[Andrew]

For a much more dry, but very thorough history of the Pacific Campaigns, try reading the official US Army histories found at

https://history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/collect/ww2-ap.html

My personal favorite is the "Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls."

Reading about and viewing official photos of Tarawa, bloody Tarawa, will make you think the Overlord campaign was massive but easy.

Many of the lessons learned at Tarawa were used at Normandy, mainly in the naval gunfire and use of rocket launching ships.

[Buster]

May I put in a word in defence of the much-maligned Hitler? Someone has to do it.

Mildly provocative, I know, but if we do have to personalise all this stuff, I’d grant him ‘blitzkrieg’. Astonishingly effective. If you’re going to try to win a war, for better or worse, don’t dick about, just do it. Does that rather impressive achievement elevate him to military genius or is he still just the frothing baddie in the war movies and the incompetent frustrated corporal? Someone who gets a marginally better press, Napoleon, who by virtue of being longer dead and thus being slightly more historically ambiguous (at least if you are French) and hampered by lower tech, aspired to be half as ‘good’. And was not that ineffective anyway.

The trouble with playing armchair favourites, intoxicating game that it is, is that it has no consequences. So, and only just for instance, you appear to have an aversion to Patton. Neither of us have met him or know him. Doesn’t seem to stop us having an opinion. Who needs facts, whatever they are, when we can have motivational and formative preconceptions. As it happens, Patton presents like a murderous pit bull, with issues. A bully or worse? But I like him on my side, in all the circs. They are all degrees of nut jobs. And just by the way Rommel seems unaccountably to get a sentimental free pass even today. When you get these kind of discrepancies or discordances you have to wonder where gossamer-like truth has gone.

The German army was quite extraordinarily effective in a crap cause for an awful long time. That’s the truly interesting fact for me. That’s the bit I don’t fully understand. Those guys were ‘horribly’ good. I’m not entirely convinced that Hitler was, in his important period, the gibbering loony we would conveniently have him.

It's always important to try to get the true measure of one’s enemies, then and now, I’d say.

[AussieD]

This is going to have to come through in two packets as it appears too large on its own.

Land warfare was never my field however discussions with “Brown Jobs”, usually over G&Ts after an enjoyable dinner, often led to the subject of ‘blitzkreig” and, like many others, I was of the opinion that the idea was one belonging to Heinz Guderian. I was suitably chastised by an infantry Colonel of considerable experience who pointed out that it was actually a concept developed by two Brits. As a result, and to avoid future embarrassment when talking to “Brown Jobs”, I did my own research

His explanation was that while Guderian did perfect the doctrine of what we know now as Blitzkrieg the concept of highly mobile forces quickly smashing through enemy defences actually goes back to the days of the armoured knight and cavalry charges. According to some historians [sorry but I can’t find my references - packed away preparatory to moving], Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden formalized a military doctrine which called for rapid movement in the battlefield along with a combined arms assault. This was later adopted by the Prussian military during the time of Field Marshal Moltke the Elder.

The tactics of German Storm Troops during WWI could be considered blitzkrieg without tanks or close air support because they planned to go on a war of manouevre, bypassing fortified lines/trenches and striking vital enemy positions in the rear or even encircling them which was the Wehrmacht's modus operandi during WWII.

What people now know as blitzkrieg where tanks over-run enemy defences with supporting infantry and air support in a swift manner comes from J.F.C Fuller and B.H. Liddell Hart. If they hadn't been at odds with the British military establishment, Britain might have been the one to employ blitzkrieg in WW2.

[AussieD]

Part Two

As to NGS [Naval Gunfire Support] it's history goes back to the early days of ship mounted canon. At the siege of Calais in 1347 Edward III deployed ships carrying bombardes and other artillery.

As to the lessons learned from Tarawa and a succinct analysis of that engagement it is worth reading

http://www.academia.edu/10496986/Naval_Gunfire_Support_from_Gallipoli_to_Tarawa

Over the centuries naval tacticians have studied and improved the use of NGS and the US experience at Tarawa certainly provided valuable lessons for the assault on Normandy albeit at huge cost to the US Marines who comprised the assault force.

There is however a vital difference in the recommendations of the report on Tarawan and the use of NGS on D-Day. The Tarawa Report concluded that prolonged NGS is desirable to eliminate defences and this is almost self evident where the target is, like Tarawa, an island. However Normandy is not an island and a prolonged preliminary bombardment would have alerted the German High Command to the impending landing and allowed them to move their reserves to positions just outside the range of the heaviest naval guns and then allow them to be used in the counter attack. The purpose at Normandy was to provide covering fire for the assault which was to be a surprise and to eliminate targets which had been previously identified and also targets of opportunity.

[David Duff]

Gentlemen, your commentary above deserves consideration and response but alas this weekend I am otherwise occupied. It is the Memsahib's birthday today and as part of the celebration 'SoD' and his Czech lovely are descending and we are out tonight for a fish supper, and tomorrow, other good friends are whisking us off to the coast for a leisurely lunch. Maybe, Sunday night will give me some spare time.

However, I will just mention to Andrew that Robin Neillands' books make extensive use of the official American histories which, alas, are not always strictly neutral - and why would they be given that they are written by men and, er, 'neutral' men are hard to find!